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U.S.S. VINCENNES (CG 49) SHOOTDOWN OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT #655:
A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE
CASE CONCERNING THE AERIAL INCIDENT OF 3 JULY 1988 ( ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
I . INTRODUCTION
On 3 July 1988 the U.S.S. VINCENNES (CG 49)
(hereinafter VINCENNES), operating in the Southern Persian
Gulf, shot down an unarmed civilian airliner, Iran Air
Flight #655, with two surface-to-air missiles. The 290
passengers and crew onboard the airbus were killed.
Following the incident, major investigations convened by the
United States Navy and the International Civil Aviation
Organization (hereinafter ICAO) revealed the aircraft was
proceeding in regularly scheduled commercial transit when
the crew of the American warship perceived the incoming
contact to be hostile and responded with deadly force.
These formal inquiries concluded the downing of the aircraft
was due to reasonable mistake in the identification of the
incoming contact caused by the compression of time, the "fog
of war" atmosphere created by a contemporaneous surface
engagement with Iranian gunboats, and a psychological
2phenomena termed "scenario fulfillment". While numerous
recommendations were implemented by ICAO to reduce the
potential for similar incidents, no sanctions were imposed
on the United States or the naval personnel involved, nor
was the use of force assessed to be illegal under
- 1 -

international law. Dissatisfied with this outcome and
convinced material facts had been intentionally
misrepresented by ICAO and the United States, Iran filed a
case in the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ)
on 17 May 1989 alleging the American missile cruiser
committed an international crime under conventional and
3
customary international law. Iran requests the ICJ condemn
the United States and direct the payment of compensation.
Iran's Application and Memorial filed with the ICJ
rests jurisdictionally on Article 36(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice which permits the Court
to review "treaties and conventions in force." Iran invokes
the compromissory clause from three mutual conventions to
satisfy this requirement: the Chicago Convention of 1944,
the Montreal Convention of 1971, and the Treaty of Amity
between the United States and Iran of 1955. The United
States has entered preliminary objections to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ and the case will be docketed for
4initial proceedings in 1992.
The VINCENNES case presents an interesting casestudy in
the legal and political issues which surround international
disputes involving national security matters and the use of
force in peacetime. First, while history contains examples
of the downing of commercial aircraft with significant
fatalities, the only previous effort to place an aerial
downing before the Court failed for want of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, there are no authoritative international legal
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rulings to consult and applicable legal principles must be
distilled from state practice. Second, the case calls for a
determination of the reach of "long-arm" compromissory
clauses common to bilateral and multilateral treaties. The
steady decline of contentious case referrals to the ICJ
noted in the past two decades under the optional provisions
of Article 36(2) means compromissory clauses common to many
international conventions could, if given broad effect, gain
increased importance as the primary generator of
international legal cases. Third, the aerial incident
presents substantive problems in the laws of neutrality,
aerial and surface warfare, and the scope of the inherent
right of self-defense in peacetime. Finally, the form and
amount of compensation due a victimized state has never been
settled. The practice of those nations responsible for
aerial downings have run the spectrum from the payment of
immediate compensation as a matter of legal obligation, to
payments dubbed "ex gratia" in order to avoid admission of
an international legal wrong, to the complete refusal to pay
any remunerations to the victimized state or its citizens.
The method of analysis adopted for purposes of this
paper will be to breakdown the Aerial Case into three parts;
jurisdiction, merits, and compensation issues. In so doing
it will be necessary to discuss background events in the
Persian Gulf which set the stage for the downing of the
airbus, the facts of the missile attack, and international
practices which have evolved from previous aerial and
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maritime incidents involving attacks on unsuspecting
airliners and ships. Juridical principles derived from this
review will then be used to test Iran's claim and forecast
how the ICJ may resolve the Aerial Case.
My thesis is that the ICJ will determine that the
compromissory clause of the Treaty of Amity Between Iran and
the United States provides international jurisdiction over
the Aerial Case. The World Court will then proceed to the
merits of the shootdown of Iran Air Flight #655 and find
that the VINCENNES acted in self-defense pursuant to Article
51 of the U.N. Charter. My analysis will conclude with a
review of the issues surrounding compensation and recommend
that an international political organ such as ICAO create a
mandatory system for determining appropriate compensation
for the unfortunate victims of aerial downings.
II. FACTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE AERIAL INCIDENT OF 3 JULY 1988
A. BACKGROUND EVENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
An exhaustive review of the eight year Iran-Iraq War is
unnecessary in analyzing the actions of VINCENNES on 3 July
1988. However, an appreciation of the frequency, flavor,
and momentum of the hostilities in the Persian Gulf is
required because aerial incidents are fact specific, and the
perceived circumstances of each encounter largely defines
the political response of the international community.
Customary international law is created through the process
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of state practice and response, and in deciphering aerial
incidents this equates to concentrating on; 1) victim state
protests, 2) aggressor state replies, 3) the reaction of
international political forums such as the United Nations
Security Council and the ICAO Council, and 4) the amount and
form of compensation which is offerred to the victimized
state
.
The Gulf War began in 1980 when Iraq invaded Iran for
the apparent purpose of territorial acquisition. The
initial fighting included massive air and land campaigns
fought predominantly on and over Iranian territory. The
conflict turned seaward in 1983 for two reasons. First,
Iraq acquired EXOCET missiles from France which gave them a
new and credible ship attack capability for their superior
5
air forces. Anti-shipping attacks were subsequently
launched by Iraq against Iranian oil tankers transiting the
Persian Gulf in an effort to cut-off the large amount of
revenue gained from the sale of Iranian oil on world
markets. Second, Iran conversely sought to stem the large
quantity of war munitions and supplies which were reaching
Iraq through seaborne commerce. Iran threatened closure of
the Straits of Hormuz in order to effectuate this embargo,
and when verbal warnings were ignored the Islamic Republic
employed small gunboats (Boghammers and Boston Whalers) to
harrass merchant shipping. Iran did not limit their
operations to Iraqi targets of opportunity or ships bound
solely for Iraq, and were indiscriminate in firing on
- 5 -

neutral ships of all nationalities innocently navigating the
7Gulf. These high speed gunboats operated from ports near
the approaches to the Straits of Hormuz, and were equipped
o
with machine guns, rocket thrown grenades, and small arms.
Along with standing up this gunboat fleet, Iran
covertly released free floating mines into the Persian Gulf
and constructed SILKWORM missile launching sites to strike
ships entering or departing the Gulf through the Straits of
9Hormuz at distances in excess of fifty miles. Iran also
used its air force to conduct military operations against
neutral shipping. As a result of these arbitrary and
aggressive military actions, the Persian Gulf became a
perilous region for unarmed oilers and merchants causing
major international shipping companies to hold their tankers
at anchor rather than risk destruction of ship and cargo.
With the stakes for an international community dependent on
Middle East oil now implicated, the United States and other
maritime powers deployed additional warships and
mine-sweepers to the Gulf in an effort to halt the
indiscriminate attacks and bring stability to the region.
The United States took the additional steps of reflagging
Kuwaiti oilers and assigning naval escorts to all tanker
convoys navigating through the Persian Gulf.
Despite these efforts to retard Iranian aggression, the
number of attacks against neutral shipping in the Gulf
12
continued to rise in 1987. These expanded operations
culminated in the apparent mistaken attack by an Iraqi
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aircraft on U.S.S. STARK ( FFG 31) (hereinafter STARK) with
13the subsequent loss of 37 American sailors. Additionally,
Irani gunboats attacked American owned merchants with
machine gun fire, the reflagged Bridgeton hit a mine while
under destroyer escort, the reflagged Sea Isle City was
attacked with SILKWORM missiles launched from Iranian
territory, and U.S. naval helicopters were frequently fired
14
upon by Irani forces. In reprisal for these latter events
the United States attacked and destroyed the Iranian owned
Rostam Oil Platform. On July 20, 1987 the U.N. Security
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 598 which demanded an
immediate ceasefire, cessation of all hostilities, and
withdrawl of all Iranian and Iraqi forces to internationally
recognized borders. The Resolution was promptly accepted
by Iraq, but Iran refused to comply with the declaration.
In 1988 the situation between Iran and the United
States continued to deteriorate. In April, U.S.S. SAMUEL B.
ROBERTS (FFG 58) was struck and severely damaged by a free
I o
floating contact mine in international waters. As further
reprisal, the United States attacked the Iranian Sirri and
Sasson Oil Production Facilities and sank three Iranian
19
vessels. An Iranian F-4 scrambled from the Bandar Abbas
airfield during this engagement in an attempt to conduct an
20
aerial attack on an American cruiser located in the area.
This ship, U.S.S. WAINWRIGHT ( CG 33), responded by launching
a missile at the Iranian F-4 when the aircraft failed to
answer repeated warnings and continued to close the ship at
- 7 -

high speed. (This exchange occurred in the same geographic
area which VINCENNES was operating in when it fired on the
airbus.) During this period an Iranian ship, the IRAN AJAR,
was also attacked and captured by U.S. military forces while
21
sowing mines in international waters. The hostilities
outlined in this abbreviated recital of events set the
backdrop for the incident of 3 July 1988, and show in
particular that:
1) Iran exceeded traditional belligerent rights in the
methods utilized to conduct maritime operations in
the Gulf War and ignored U.N. Security Council
Resolutions directing them to cease hostilities;
2) These illegal acts triggered a U.S. build-up of
naval forces in the region with substantial
armament and capabilities;
3) Hostilities between the U. S. and Iran became more
frequent and the rhetoric more virulent with each
incident; and
4) The United States progressed from a policy of
neutrality toward Iran to one of "nonbelligerency",
a posture which did not seek direct combat with
Iranian force but permitted returning fire or
committing acts of reprisal if American forces were
provoked or attacked by hostile gunboats.
B. SHOOTDOWN OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT #655
As the above illustrates, the situation in the Persian
- 8 -

Gulf was one of confrontation between U.S. naval vessels
attempting to protect neutral shipping, and Iranian military
units seeking to interdict this shipping using tactics which
appear inconsistent with the U.N. Charter and laws of
warfare enshrined in the Hague Conventions of 1907. On the
morning of 3 July 1988 tensions were escalated by a broad
pattern of Iranian attacks on neutral merchants during the
previous two days, and intelligence reports suggesting an
Iranian strike against American forces was likely during the
July 4 holiday period. At 0300 the U.S.S. ELMER
MONTGOMERY ( FF 1082) observed approximately thirteen Iranian
gunboats position themselves for an attack on a Pakistani
merchant steaming in international waters just beyond Iran's
territorial sea. Following a request for assistance from
the unarmed merchant, VINCENNES was directed to the area and
placed in command of the two American warships. VINCENNES
launched a helicopter for investigatory purposes which was
23
subsequently fired on by the Irani gunboats. VINCENNES
closed the position of the helicopter and small boats, and
attacked and sank two Irani craft with naval gunfire at 0643
when these gunboats were judged to have displayed hostile
24intent toward VINCENNES. During the course of the surface
engagement VINCENNES manuevered into the territorial sea of
25Iran
.
As this surface confrontation progressed Iran Air
Flight #655 took off from Bandar Abbas Airfield for a
routine commercial flight across the Persian Gulf to Dubai.
- 9 -

The airbus departed from a joint military and civilian
airstrip approximately 27 minutes after its scheduled
departure time. (There was no communication system in place
to notify warships when commercial airliners were not on
schedule, and the delay experienced by Iran Air Flight #655
dispels the popular myth that VINCENNES could have readily
identified the contact if local commercial air schedules had
only been checked.) The airbus ascended normally within its
assigned air corridor apparently unaware of the ongoing
naval engagement below. The airbus was piloted by an
experienced crew and squawked its assigned IFF mode III code
276760. (The proper broadcasting of coded commercial
aircraft identifying data by the Iranian airbus debunks a
second myth that the aircraft was masking its identity or
impersonating a military fighter.) Personnel on VINCENNES
first detected this air contact at 0647 to the north at 47
nautical miles (hereinafter NM) moving toward the ship on a
2 8
constant bearing and decreasing range. VINCENNES issued
seven voice warnings on the military air distress frequency
(243.0mhz) and three on the international air distress
network (121.5mhz) which warned the aircraft, identified
then as an F-14, to stay clear of the warship and requested
29the aircraft's identity and purpose. (Subsequent
investigation revealed Iranian commercial aircraft were not
monitoring the military distress frequency.) Personnel on
VINCENNES estimated the incoming contact was a military
fighter jet in an attack profile and requested and received
- 10 -

permission from higher authority to engage the aircraft if
30it closed within 20 NM of the ship. As warnings continued
without response, the Captain of VINCENNES made the decision
to fire on the incoming aircraft at 0653 with two
surface-to-air missiles. The missiles intercepted Iran Air
Flight #655 over the territorial airspace of Iran at a range
31
of 8 NM from VINCENNES. The blast destroyed the aircraft
and killed all personnel onboard, and the wreckage was
subsequently discovered in Iranian internal waters. The
black box which recorded key aeronautical data about the
abruptly interrupted seven minute flight has never been
located. The dead consisted of 290 personnel from six
32different nations.
C. AFTERMATH OF THE SHOOTDOWN
The first announcement of the shootdown by the United
States proved the adage it is unwise to place credence in
initial battle reports. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral William Crowe, hastily reported from the
Pentagon that the Iranian airliner was outside its
prescribed air corridor, descending toward VINCENNES at
increased speed in an attack profile, squawking a military
33
IFF code, and ignoring repeated verbal warnings. Various
theories were suggested to explain this event: the
possibility an Iranian F-14 was using the civilian airliner
as cover to sneak in on the Aegis cruiser; that Iran Air
Flight #655 was planning a sneak attack on the cruiser or
- 11 -

conducting a kamikaze suicide mission; or the airliner was
acting in concert with the gunboats in a coordinated air and
34
surface attack. Admiral Crowe stated unequivocally, and
the United States has never retreated from this point, that
VINCENNES acted in self-defense after determining the ship
35
was about to be attacked by an Iranian F-14. Admiral
Crowe also appointed a formal investigation which was
completed on 28 July 1988. The U.S. Navy investigation
concluded VINCENNES did not purposely attack a civilian
airliner and that in light of the circumstances the
Commanding Officer of VINCENNES acted prudently.
The Government of Iran complained immediately after the
incident to the United Nations and ICAO. The U.N. Security
Council discussed the shootdown on 14 July 1988 where Vice
President Bush reiterated this was an accident caused in
"substantial measure" by Iran's failure to divert a civilian
37
airliner from a known combat zone. On 20 July 1988 the
Council unanimously adopted a resolution which expressed
deep distress over the aerial incident but was silent in
affixing blame or directing the payment of compensation to
Iran. While the U.N. Council deliberated in New York, the
ICAO Council convened in Montreal and approved a statement
which expressed condolences to Iran, deplored the use of
weapons against civilian aircraft, and instituted an
39investigation. The ICAO inquiry was completed on 7
November 1988 and generally echoed the conclusions of the
U.S. Navy report. ICAO agreed VINCENNES 1 evaluation of the
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contact as hostile was erroneous but reasonable in view of
40
the external circumstances.
Immediately after the incident President Reagan
announced the United States would provide voluntary
compensation to the families of the victims of all
41
nationalities on an ex gratia basis. All nations save
Iran accepted this offer, but Iran maintained such payments
were not satisfactory unless compensation was accompanied by
admissions from the United States that the attack was
wrongful and reparations were due as a matter of legal
42
right. When the United States refused to meet this
condition Iran ended all diplomatic communication over this
matter and went directly to the ICJ in an attempt to gain
legal vindication.
III. HISTORICAL INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE SHOOTDOWN OF
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
A. AERIAL INCIDENTS
The first recorded aerial incident dates back to 1904
when the Russians downed a German balloon which strayed over
43its border. Since then there have been a number of
reported incidents involving civil and military aircraft
which were either accidentally or intentionally shot down.




a) April 29, 1952 an Air France plane was attacked by
fighters from the Soviet Union and managed an
emergency landing in Berlin with two seriously
wounded passengers. The Soviets claimed the plane
intruded into their airspace and refused to land
when directed, but circumstantial evidence suggested
the plane was within the Berlin air corridor. The
British, American, French, and Allied High
Commissioner for Germany all voiced their outrage
and stated that the attack on an unarmed airliner in
time of peace is contrary to standards of civilized
behavior. The Soviet government refused all claims
44for compensation.
b) July 23, 1954 a Cathay Pacific aircraft on a
scheduled commercial flight was shot down by the
People's Republic of China killing 13, six of which
were U.S. nationals. The world community again
responded with outrage, the Chinese took
responsibility and stated it acted in the mistaken
belief that the aircraft was on a mission of
aggression, and made ex gratia payments to the
British government in an amount equivalent to
45
nearly one million dollars.
c) July 27, 1955 an EL AL Israel Airliner was shot down
by Bulgaria near the Greco-Bulgarian border. All 58
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passengers onboard were killed. Evidence showed the
fighters knew the aircraft was a commercial aircraft
and Bulgaria later admitted it was wrong, expressed
its profound regret, and promised to punish those
responsible. The United States, United Kingdom, and
Israel filed claims in the ICJ but the Court
ultimately determined it lacked jurisdiction over
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government offered ex gratia
46
compensation to the victims.
d) February 21, 1973 Israel shot down a Libyan Boeing
727 that flew over the Israeli-occupied Sinai
killing 108 people. Israel contended that
intelligence information suggested the aircraft
was on a hostile mission and that its fighters had
acted in strict compliance with international law.
Israel was condemned by the ICAO Council,
subsequently expressed its profound sorrow, and made




e) September 1, 1983 a Soviet fighter shot down Korean
Air Flight 007, killing 269 people, after it strayed
over sensitive Soviet territory. The Soviet Union
claimed the aircraft was engaged in espionage and
ignored repeated warnings to land, but tape
recordings of the pilot's conversation with ground
- 15 -

control suggested otherwise. ICAO and the U.N.
condemned the Soviet's actions. Recent investigative
reporting by the Soviet newspaper Izvetsia confirms
that no attempt was made to communicate with the
aircraft on emergency frequencies, tracers were not
fired, and the aircraft did not perform evasion
manuevers . The Soviet press also speculates that
KAL #007 was shot down over international waters and
the black boxes from the aircraft were recovered,
but Soviet authorities are withholding the
information because of its inculpatory nature. At
this point the Soviet government has refused all
claims for compensation.
These capsulized renditions of the five historical
incidents are valuable to this analysis in that they show
previous downings have occured under widely different
factual circumstances, yet no state has been judicially
chastised by the ICJ despite clear condemnation from
international political organs. The Chicago Convention and
the Montreal Convention have not been utilized to gain
jurisdictional or substantive footing, and no state has
looked to a friendship treaty for additional legal leverage.
While there are occasions when states do not resort to all
conventional or customary remedies available under
international law, the mass killing of its nationals is
generally an event which would precipitate the most
- 16 -

aggressive legal and diplomatic response possible. The
Koreans, for example, would have little reason not to invoke
these treaties, if legally relevant, after the Soviets
refused to apologize or even discuss compensation issues.
It is also interesting to compare and contrast factual
aspects of the VINCENNES incident with prior shootdowns.
There are clear similarites between the Chinese use of force
after a mistaken identification during a period of
heightened regional tensions, and the Israeli reaction
following ominous intelligence reports. The most obvious
difference, on the other hand, is the Iranian airbus did not
intrude into another state's territory prior to being
attacked, and the VINCENNES was the only attacking force to
be located extra-territorially when force was applied
against a commercial aircraft.
Common to all examples is that no state argued
international law affords the right to down intruding
commercial aircraft. While Israel and the Soviet Union
hinted that they believed their actions were consistent with
international law, each of these nations later backtracked
from this position and attempted to differentiate their
situation on the facts. This is important because it
suggests a customary norm has steadily evolved against the
use of force on commercial aircraft. This evolving norm
gained full international acceptance when codified by the
Montreal Protocal of 1986, which amends Article 3 of the
Chicago Convention with new language recognizing that every
- 17 -

state must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons
49
against civil aircraft in flight.
B. MARITIME INCIDENTS
To complete the historical picture three other
maritime accidents involving the United States as the
victimized nation warrant consideration:
f) 11 December 1937 U.S.S. PANAY (PR 5) was mistaken as
a Chinese troopship and attacked by Japanese
aircraft while anchored in the Yangtze River. This
event marked the first time a U.S. Navy ship was
sunk by a hostile force. Japan's quick apology and
reparations in the amount of $2.2 million were
50
accepted by the United States.
g) 8 June 1967 U.S.S. LIBERTY (AGER 5) was attacked
while patrolling in the eastern Mediterranean Sea by
Israeli aircraft. The incident occurred at the
height of hostilities in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
and many writers have theorized the ship was
deliberately attacked in order to prevent
interception of communications intelligence which
would have forewarned the United States of Israel's
plan to invade the Golan Heights. Israel offered an
apology and paid nearly $10 million in
compensation. Although the United States accepted
- 18 -

this payment, it did so while maintaining
compensation was legally required.
h) 17 May 1987 U.S.S. Stark (FFG 31) was attacked by an
Iraqi Mirage while on patrol in the central Persian
Gulf as discussed supra. Iraq formally accepted
responsibility for the attack, expressed profound
regret for "the unintentional incident", and paid
approximately $37 million in reparations. Again the
United States accepted the compensation but insisted
52the payments were legally required.
These latter examples contain many of the similarities
previously noted. All three ships were operating in or near
a regional combat zone in which the United States was a
declared neutral. The mission of each ship was to protect
U.S. interests, and the official explanation by the
attacking nation was "mistaken identity." The nations which
launched the attacks quickly expressed deep regrets, made
formal diplomatic apologies, and backed this up with
adequate and effective compensation. No state argued
international law insulated the attacking state from
responsibility to pay damages even though the incidents
occurred during periods of hostilities and were accidental.
The United States and the international community accepted
this method of resolution as legally and politically
sufficient, although disagreement remains over whether the
- 19 -

compensation was properly offered in ex gratia form, or as a
matter of legal right. This state practice may suggest a
further feature of the evolving customary law includes the
mandatory payment of some form of compensation to the
victimized state.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION OF 1944
Multilateral conventions are the primary source of air
law and the most definitive and widely ratified aviation
53treaty is the Chicago Convention of 1944. The first
meeting was attended by representatives of more than fifty
states who were invited by the United States to join with it
in establishing a comprehensive legal framework for
54international civil aviation after the Second World War.
Three fundamental principles emerged from the conference and
formed the foundation of the treaty; l)the exclusive
sovereignty over state airspace, 2)the equality of
commercial opportunity, and 3) the development of safe,
orderly, and efficient civil aviation. The text of the
convention is divided into four major parts which cover air
navigation, the organization and structure of ICAO, air
transport and dispute settlement. It is a provision within
this final part, specifically Article 84, which Iran
contends gives the ICJ jurisdiction over the VINCENNES
aerial incident. The text of the article reads:
- 20 -

If any disagreement between two contracting States
relating to the interpretation or application ... cannot
be settled by negotiation, it shall, on application of
any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by
the Council. No member of the Council shall vote in the
consideration by the Council of any dispute to which
it is a party. Any contracting State may... appeal from
the decision from the decision of the Council to an ad
hoc tribunal ... or to the Permanent Court of
International Justice.
The elements required to enable the Council to address
a complaint under Article 84 are: l)a disagreement;
2)arising over the "interpretation" or "application" of the
convention; 3) which cannot be resolved by negotiation. An
appeal from the decision of the Council made pursuant to
this dispute settlement process is possible either to an ad
hoc arbitral tribunal or the ICJ. Article 84 is a typical
compromissory clause with standard boilerplate language, and
the United States is a party to at least forty such
55
agreements consenting to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
Some multilateral treaties such as the Convention Against
Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment of 1984 makes the compromissory clause, complete
with referral to the ICJ, optional with a requirement for a
specific declaration accepting the settlement provision. But
Article 84 of the Chicago Convention is not similarly
optional, and the U.S. and Iran became bound by the
compromissory provision when they ratified the treaty.
The procedural mechanisms created in Article 84 for the
settlement of international aviation disputes have been
invoked on very few occasions. Professor Buergenthal
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speculates that the very existence of this adjudication
process has contributed to encouraging states to resolve
their differences through diplomatic negotiation rather than
engaging in lengthy quasi- judicial hearings which may have
an economic and political downside.
The sole time the ICJ reviewed an ICAO decision
pursuant to Article 84 was in Appeal Relating to the
Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council ( India v. Pakistan) in
571972. Pakistan's claim concerned alleged breaches by
India of the Chicago Convention for suspending overflight of
Indian territory by Pakistan, following a hijacking incident
involving the diversion of an Indian aircraft to Pakistan.
Pakistan submitted the matter to the ICAO Council for
adjudication under Article 84 and the Council assumed
jurisdiction over the disagreement. India appealed the
unfavorable ICAO ruling to the ICJ contending the ICAO
Council lacked jurisdiction over the matter because this was
not a dispute involving the interpretation or application of
the convention. The ICJ held the ICAO Council was competent
to review this matter under Article 84 . While the case is
dissimilar on the merits to the VINCENNES incident, the ICJ
opinion is instructive in showing the step-by-step
procedures used by the ICAO Council when conducting Article
84 adjudication and how the Court exercises judicial reviev;
over the conventional process.
Iran's Memorial urges the Court to determine the
actions of the ICAO Council in the months following the
- 22 -

shootdown of Iran Air Flight #655 amounted to Article 84
adjudication, making it now ripe for direct appeal to the
ICJ. The United States has responded that the actions of
the Council did not constitute Article 84 proceedings and
cannot, therfor, confer appellate jurisdiction on the ICJ.
It is necessary to return to the elements of the dispute
settlement provision to determine if Iran has sufficiently
complied with the dispute resolution criteria created by
Article 84 and related implementing regulations.
1. ELEMENT ONE: THE DISAGREEMENT
The contentious jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under
Article 84 is premised on the existence of a "disagreement."
The term "disagreement" is not further defined in the
treaty, but the ICJ has provided guidance on what
constitutes an international dispute or disagreement. In
the case concerning the Interpretation of Peace Treaties,
the Court said:
Whether there exists an international dispute is a
matter for objective determination. The mere denial of
the existence of a dispute does not prove its
non-existence. .
.
In the South West Africa case the ICJ held:
The question which calls for the Court's consideration
is whether the dispute is a "dispute" envisaged within
Article 36 of the Statute of the Court... The language
used is broad, clear and concise: it gives rise to no
ambiguity and it permits of no exception. It refers to
any dispute whatever relating not to any one particular
provision (but to) all provisions (in the treaty)...
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These legal pronouncements of the ICJ infer a broad
reading of the types of disputes which would satisfy Article
84. It would seem that any legitimate point of contention
between two states over civil aviation even remotely
connected to the Convention could be pled creatively enough
to meet this low threshhold. On the facts of the VINCENNES
incident, Iran's unhesitant communication of its outrage to
ICAO and the United Nations for the downing of an Iranian
commercial airliner, followed by the equally rapid response
of the United States averring the actions of VINCENNES were
legal, creates a qualifying "dispute" between two
contracting States. Almost two years have passed since the
incident and the positions of the parties remain
uncompromising. The lack of realistic diplomatic prospects
for settling the "disagreement" further reinforces that the
controversy is concrete and ripe.
2. ELEMENT TWO: THE "INTERPRETATION" OR "APPLICATION"
OF THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
The substance of the disagreement referred to must, in
addition, be based on an "interpretation" or "application"
of the convention. Completing this analysis requires
comparing the merits of the aerial incident against the
substantive reach of the Chicago Convention. In this
regard, Articles 1 and 2 extend complete state sovereignty
over airspace above land territory and Article 3(c)
prohibits another aircraft from flying over that territory
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without permission. As developed in the factual sequence,
supra, the VINCENNES vectored a U.S. Navy helicopter into
the airspace of Iran and then manuevered into the
territorial sea of Iran prior to launching two missiles at
the airbus. Iran contends this intrusion was a
non-consensual sovereign trespass into its air and sea
territory. Iran's contention is bolstered by the Commanding
Officer of U.S.S. SIDES ( FFG 14) who wrote nearly one year
after the incident that the helicopter of VINCENNES "got too
C Q
damned close to the boats for its own good." While the
state parties dispute exactly when VINCENNES penetrated the
territorial sea and airspace of Iran, the United States
admits such passage occurred and that the airbus was shot
down over Iranian territory. These facts present a
legitmate dispute regarding state sovereignty over
territorial airspace, and as such should qualify as one
arising under Articles 1-3 of the Chicago Convention.
Although the alleged territorial trespass of Iranian
sea and airspace is likely enough to meet the "arising
under" requirement, Iran can also point to Article 9 for
additional and independent substantive support. This
provision permits a state to temporarily restrict or
prohibit air traffic over certain areas of its territory in
times of military necessity or public safety. The United
States relied on the authority of this article to issue
Notices to Mariners in 1984 and 1987 (hereinafter NOTAM) for
the Persian Gulf region which warned civilian and military
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aircraft not to close within 5 nautical miles or 2000 feet
59
elevation of American ships. Iran consistently challenged
these moving security "bubbles" of unspecified duration as
illegal under the convention, and as these NOTAM ' s may have
contributed to the aerial incident, they too could amount to
a substantive disagreement arising from the Chicago
Convention. The scope and contour of Article 89, which
deals with the impact of war and emergency conditions on the
applicability of treaty provisions, may be another provision
implicated by the aerial incident.
3. ELEMENT THREE; PRIOR NEGOTIATIONS
Article 84 requires states involved in a "disagreement"
arising from the Chicago Convention to first attempt to
resolve the problem through negotiation before referring the
matter to the ICAO Council for quasi- judicial proceedings.
This requirement is common to compromissory clauses in
international treaties and is placed within the text of the
settlement provision to ensure all friendly efforts to
resolve the dispute have been attempted before international
organs officially intervene. The responsibility to
negotiate is not cast in legal stone though, and
international law and practice give deferrence to the state
bringing the claim on the theory states are in the best
position to judge whether additional diplomatic negotiation
may resolve the disagreement. The requirement to
negotiate is analagous to the exhaustion of local remedies
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doctrine which restricts resort to international courts
until the State where the alleged violation occurred is
afforded an opportunity to redress the complaint. The rule
is subject to exceptions; the primary one being where if it
is clear that exhaustion of local remedies would not be
ft l
effective, there is no need to pursue them. The United
States has made it clear through repeated public statements
that it will not concede responsibility for the aerial
incident, and denies an international wrong was committed.
Accordingly, Iran could reasonably infer that bilateral
negotiations would be fruitless and ineffective, and would
not be required as a condition precedent prior to filing a
complaint with the ICAO Council or on appeal to the ICJ.
4. ICAO COUNCIL PROCEDURES
As discussed above, Iran's claim satisfies the
procedural and substantive elements for admissability
established in Article 84. The crux of the analysis now
shifts to whether Iran requested dispute settlement
proceedings, and if not, whether the deliberations conducted
by the ICAO Council in the wake of the VINCENNES incident
substantially complied with ICAO rules for Article 84
adjudication. The failure to conduct quasi- judicial
proceedings which satisfy the compromissory provision of the
Chicago Convention would likely defeat referral of this
matter to the ICJ since the World Court is restricted in
this instance to appellate jurisdiction.
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Iran has no evidence that it expressly requested
Article 84 proceedings, but argues that since the decision
and resolution of the ICAO Council were based on a full
review of the evidence it constituted an equivalent action.
Iran points to their immediate communications to the
President of the ICAO Council requesting effective measures
be taken to condemn the United States, and the
Extraordinary Sessions of the Council which considered the
VINCENNES aerial incident, as proof that adjudicatory
"dispute settlement" was functionally performed.
The first deliberation on Iran's complaint, conducted
13-14 July 1988, included addresses from both state parties
to the dispute and the official views of representatives
from thirty two member nations. This meeting concluded with
the institution of a formal fact-finding investigation.
President of the Council Kotaite stated:
The imperative task for the Council is to collect all
vital information and reach a technical understanding
of the chain of events which led to this tragedy. We
have to explore every element of our international
regulations in the ICAO Standards, Recommended,.
Practices, guidance material and procedures...
The ICAO Council reconvened 5-7 December 1988 to consider
the investigation report and an interim decision was reached
following additional remarks from representatives of Iran
65
and the United States. The Council met for the last time
on 13-17 March 1989 and a final decision was rendered. The
ICAO Council adopted a consensus resolution at this meeting
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which reaffirmed its policy condemning the use of weapons
against civilian airliners but labelled the VINCENNES
incident "a consequence of events and errors in
identification of the aircraft which resulted in the
fi ft
accidental destruction of an Iran Airliner."
While this deliberative history confirms detailed
review was conducted and concluded by the ICAO Council, an
analysis of the meetings reveals they were not done in
accordance with the dispute settlement provisions of Article
84. When Article 84 proceedings are convened the ICAO
Council has standing Rules for the Settlement of Differences
which require written pleadings, a verbatim transcript,
written arguments, and a final decision which includes
voting records. Article 84 also expressly requires
parties to the dispute refrain from voting, and envisions a
quasi- judicial forum which produces a formal record suitable
for appellate review by the ICJ. The ICAO Council Appeal
Case, reflects strict compliance with these statutory
requirements and procedural regulations. India submitted a
lengthy memorial to' the Council, Pakistan responded with an
equally detailed counter-memorial, the oral arguments and
minutes of each meeting were recorded and transcribed in
verbatim, and the voting record of each state was
A + A 68documented
.
This precedent contrasts dramatically with the format
of ICAO Council proceedings into the VINCENNES incident
where pleadings were not filed by the parties, the United
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States was permitted to vote on the resolution, individual
state votes were not recorded, verbatim records were not
kept, and at no time did any delegate refer to the hearings
69
and consultation as Article 84 adjudication. The meetings
were not conducted in a judicial format, and at no time did
Iran request such formalism.
The ICAO Council was more likely acting in their policy
capacity under Article 54 and 55 which permits consideration
of substantive matters relating to the convention, and
authorizes conducting investigations when appropriate. The
Canadian delegate specifically stated the Council reviewed
70the VINCENNES incident under Article 55. Even more
telling, the ICAO Legal Director, Dr. Milde, was present
during the meetings and stated shortly thereafter:
...You will note the proceedings in the Council (on the
VINCENNES incident) did not follow the Rules for
Settlement of Differences because the matter was not
submitted to the Council under the terms of Chapter
XVIII (includes Article 84) but was considered under
the terms of Article 54 (n)...
5. CHICAGO CONVENTION WRAP-UP
The evidence referred to above compels the conclusion
the ICAO Council did not render a decision under Article 84.
This leaves Iran with the difficult task of persuading the
ICJ that even if the technical provisions were not observed,
the Court should use supervisory powers to find substantial
compliance with Article 84. This contention might be more
persuasive in domestic law settings where judges
occassionally resort to legal activism to loosely construe a
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statute, but it should not prevail in the World Court for a
number of reasons. First, ICAO is a specialized agency
having wide international responsibilities. Article 57 of
the U.N. Charter recognizes its special influence and gives
such agencies a preferred position of deference. The ICJ
knows the ICAO Council was aware of the dispute settlement
provisions in the Convention and could have relied on these
procedures, rather than Article 54-55, to address the
VINCENNES situation. It would not be judicious for the ICJ
to review an agency determination which was intended as a
policy judgment and lacks the formal pleadings and argument
necessary to properly frame the legal issues for purposes of
effective appellate analysis.
Second, judicial oversight of ICAO Council
inner-workings would usurp much of the authority of the ICAO
Council granted by the Chicago Convention and tamper with a
comprehensive multilateral treaty which has been a true
international political and legal success story. The
vitality of international law springs from treaties like
this one which silently promote civil aviation throughout
the world.
Third, Iran could have at any time requested the ICAO
Council utilize quasi- judicial hearing format described in
Article 84 to resove the aerial incident. In fact, the
option to request Article 84 proceedings is still available
to Iran, and if resorted to without corresponding ICAO
action, would enhance their claim. Iran was either
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initially unaware of the dispute settlement provisions or
had secondary motives for not wanting to elevate this to a
higher level of scrutiny within the ICAO Council where
Iranian military actions in the Persian Gulf may have been
critically reviewed. The ICJ should not allow a contracting
party who fails to utilize and exhaust remedies expressly
provided for in the compromissory clause to be ignored
without consequence.
Finally, multilateral treaties are created by states
willing to surrender a portion of their sovereignty in
exchange for international stability in areas of mutual
interest. The contracting parties have a right to expect
that carefully drafted compromissory provisions will be
respected and strictly applied by the ICJ. States desiring
broader judicial intervention can accept the compulsory
authority of the ICJ under Article 36 of the Statute of the
Court. Those states which elect not to accept this
compulsory jurisdiction, but rather join bilateral or
multilateral treaties with more limited access to the Court,
should not get "bootstrapped" into the ICJ unless the
compromissory provisions they ratified were fully complied
with
.
For the reasons outlined above, Article 84 of the
Chicago Convention does not provide Iran a basis for




B. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1971
Iran claims the conduct of the Commanding Officer of
VINCENNES, and the United States, constituted an
international offense under the Montreal Convention. Iran
further contends that by failing to take all measures to
prevent and punish such offense with severe penalties the
United States also violated Articles 3 and 10 of that
Convention. The United States has made it clear it
considers the actions of VINCENNES to have been lawful, and
72has no intention of prosecuting the Commanding Officer.
The United States also answers that the Montreal Convention
does not speak to the VINCENNES incident, where the real
issue is the anticipatory use of force in self-defense under
the U.N. Charter and customary law. Both Iran and the
United States ratified the Montreal Convention without
reservation
.
The Montreal Convention contains a compromissory clause
which closely tracks that of the Chicago Convention.
Article 14 states that disagreements which cannot be settled
through negotiation and arbitration may be referred to the
ICJ. Rather than repeating the prior analysis used to break
down the compromissory clause elements of the "dispute",
"application" and"interpretation" under the convention , etc
.
,
discussion of the compromis will be reserved until
substantive aspects of the Convention are reviewed. This is
prudent because the most pressing legal issue raised by
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tragedy over Lockerbie, Scotland where mounting evidence is
pointing to the involvement of Syria. By taking a firm
stance against extending the reach of Article 1 to state
acts the U.S. may be limiting the international diplomatic
and legal arsenal which might have otherwise been employed
to combat state terrorism directed against aircraft.)
The United Nations General Assembly urged full support
7 ft
for these three conventions , and these agreements deserve
some credit for stemming the rising tide of aerial hijacking
and terrorism in the international community. (Although the
recent midair explosion of an Austrian Airliner over Bangkok
killing 223, if the product of terrorist activity, may
suggest the battle is far from won.) The head of the United
States delegation during the negotiation over the Montreal
Convention commented later that:
...(The Montreal Convention) did not define new
offenses-it covers acts which already are common
crimes .. .What this Convention does is to impose
obligations on states to prosecute or extradite
offenders. It (warns) individuals that the
international community has responded with unanimity
to condemn such acts.
This insight serves to confirm that the Convention is
dedicated entirely toward sending a strong signal to
saboteurs and terrorists that they can run but not hide.
There is nothing in the the textual language or the
legislative history to support that Article 1 has the sub
rosa intention of making states potential offenders.
The Vienna Convention provision on treaty
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interpretation (Article 31) also takes into account:
...any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the
R
agreement of the parties
regarding it interpretation.
Two of the aerial incidents outlined, supra, occurred after
the Montreal Convention entered into force and present
examples of the use of force against commercial airliners by
states which ratified the agreement. The downing of the
Libyan Boeing 727 and KAL #007 (especially in light of new
evidence from the Soviet Union concerning the deliberate
prosecution and destruction of the commercial airliner)
present more compelling factual cases for extending the
coverage of Article 1 to states because the downing was
intentionally performed or the product of reckless
indifference, and the ICAO Council investigated the matters
and issued resolutions condemning the states' actions as
79illegal uses of force. Thus the dual requirements of
Article 1 that the act against the commercial aircraft be
both intentional and unlawful were arguably satisfied by the
conduct of the Israeli and Soviet fighters. The failure of
either ICAO, or other interested states, to raise the
Montreal Convention as a source of international legal
authority despite its apparent application to these
incidents suggests it was not deemed to reach such events.
The ordinary usage of the terms of Article 1, coupled
with the object and purpose of the treaty and its subsequent
practice, all support the view the Montreal Convention was
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because the crew of VINCENNES could not have misidentif ied
Iran Air Flight #655 as a military aircraft and the Captain
acted with the purposeful intention of shooting down the
airbus as it flew in Iranian territorial airspace. Iran
reaches this conclusion by pointing to the state of the art
Aegis radar and console system on VINCENNES which is
advertised as the most technically advanced in the world.
Iran contends that surely this equipment must have displayed
that the airbus was ascending at a steady speed and on a
flight profile consistent with that of a commercial
aircraft. Iran reinforces this point by recalling that
other American warships in the area did not treat the air
contact as hostile, and that the correct squawking of the
Mode III IFF signal fully disclosed the true identity of the
aircraft. Lastly Iran reminds the Court that the aircraft
was fired on at a distance of 11 NM from the warship despite
the NOTAM advisement that an aircraft would only be
jeopardized if it closed within 5 NM of an American naval
unit.
The United States has consistently answered these
allegations with firm reliance on the right of unit
self-defense under customary law and Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. Viewed from the American perspective, the
Commanding Officer of VINCENNES was directly engaged in an
on-going surface engagement initiated by Iranian gunboats.
The Captain reasonably surmised the incoming contact, which
took off from a military airfield and was headed directly
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toward his ship, presented a hostile threat. The crew of
VINCENNES issued repeated warnings which went unanswered,
and the Commanding Officer requested permission from higher
authority and waited until the last possible second before
launching intercept missiles. The United States emphasizes
that these facts, linked with the compression of time and
fog of war conditions, could have reasonably led the Captain
to assess that the use of force was necessary and
proportionate to protect his crew and ship. In the view of
the United States the decision to fire was a professional
judgment based in good faith on a factually complex combat
scenario made so by the intentional aggression of Iranian
naval forces.
As Professor McDougal noted in 1965, all aerial
incidents involving the shootdown of commercial airliners
O
-J
center on basic disagreements with respect to the facts.
This was clearly the case in the aftermath of the KAL #007
downing (where it now appears that Soviet authorities
deliberately concealed or distorted material facts), and it
also appears to be at play in the VINCENNES matter. One
vital difference between these two incidents is that the
ICAO Council conducted their own investigation in each case
and opined through resolution that the actions of the United
States were not intentional or unlawful, while the actions
of the Soviet Union were in contravention of international
law. A specific proposal from the Soviet Union to condemn




aggression was defeated by vote of the Council. The ICAO
Council did not hesitate to affix accountability when Israel
and the Soviet Union shot down commercial airliners under
more notorious circumstances despite their claims of self-
defense or provocation. Additionally, the U.N. Security
Council was equally satisfied the VINCENNES did not
knowingly fire on a civilian aircraft. Similar efforts by
delegates to the U.N. Security Council to have the actions
of VINCENNES condemned as illegal under international law
84
were overwhelmingly defeated.
A determination that the Commanding Officer of
VINCENNES acted illegally under Article 1 of the Montreal
Convention would also be inconsistent with state practices
created by previous aerial incidents. The VINCENNES is the
only platform to have fired on a commercial airliner while
engaged in armed conflict. This scenario differs
dramatically from the Soviet SU-15 pilot which was not under
threat of attack and had full opportunity to visually
identify the Korean airliner before firing two air-to-
air AA-3 ANAB missiles at the commercial aircraft.
Subsequent disclosures by the Russian pilot, Lt . Col.
Osipovich, establish that the efforts to warn off the Korean
plane were de minimus, and that the aircraft was actually
slowing down and possibly located outside Soviet airspace
o c
when the order to fire was received. Similarly the four
Israeli interceptor jets which fired on the Libyan Airlines




airliner. None of these military officers were held
accountable under conventional law. It would be anoraolous
for international law, which is heavily influenced by state
practice, to suddenly find Article 1 of the Montreal
Convention applicable to the Captain of the VINCENNES when
the aerial incident which he was involved in lacks factual
evidence of intentional illegal conduct.
3. COMPROMISSORY JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 14
Iran contends it is unnecessary to actually prove the
VINCENNES violated Article 1 of the Montreal Convention in
order to invoke the compromissory provisions of Article 14
which permit referral of disputes to the ICJ. The language
cf Article 14 closely tracks the requirements cf Article 84
of the Chicago Convention and sets up a settlement regime
which first looks to friendly diplomatic r.etctiation , then
independent arbitration, and failing resolution within six
months, referral tc the ICJ.
Iran argues that it is evident from their immediate
complaint, followed by the denial cf responsibility by the
United States , that a valid dispute exists between the
;
-
parties which cannot he settled by friendly negotiation.
Iran attempts tc avoid the second step in the settlement
process, arbitration, by pleading that other interim
resolution procedures car. be waived when it is evident that
rescrt tc further extra-judicial forums would he futile.
Iran tresur.es that suitahle artitration could not be
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arranged within the six month window and is therefor just
another diplomatic tool . th little value under the
circ-~star.ces. The Ambatielos Case ( Greece v . UK ) , decided
by the ICJ in 1953 came to the Court through the
co-promissory clause of a mutual convention which had an
arbitration provision graftec ir.cc the text of the
ccrr.proms . " " England refused to consent to arbitrate t
dispute and the V.orld Court held Greece had a right to
cc~pel resort to the dispute settlement mechanisms of the
cc~prc:'issory clause prior to referring the matter to the
ICJ. As the corapromssory clause of the Montreal Convention
similarly requires arbitration as a second step, Iran maj
find they are standing in the sarre legal shoes which the
British wore in the Ambatielos Case.
The effcrts cf Ire:, tc rea'j the arbitration requirement
out cf Article 14 should not be persuasive to tr.e Cc.rt.
The ICJ has stated that omissicr.s of this nature are only
permissible when "there is a reasonable probability that
further negotiation would r.ct Lead tc a settlement.
J.S. cffer tc cisc.ss ccrper.sacion with Iran presents
further cccortunity fcr ciplcratic discussions vhicr. have
r.ct ceer. e x r. a u s c e c , ir.: I r a r. s h c - 1 c r. c t he a 1 1 c • e c tc rebuff
cffers tc negotiate cr arbitrate sclely because this method
cf resolution does not include the admission of criminality
Irar. had the opportunity to press for the condemnation
cf tr.e Unitec States in the U.N. Security Council and tr.e
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ICAO Council, but failed to win such a concession from these
international political organs. Iran now seeks to carry
this argument to the World Court on the hope a judicial
outcome will be more to their liking. While that might be a
legitimate strategy if there was an independent bases for
jurisdiction in the Court, it would be improper to allow a
state to sidestep conventional links in the dispute
resolution chain simply because of a state's dissatisfaction
with rulings or resolutions issued by public international
forums
.
The arguments made for strictly construing the
compromissory clause of the Chicago Convention have equal
application in this context. Restated, the contracting
parties to an international agreement carefully weigh
exposure to the ICJ which may be created by compromissory
language buried within the text of a treaty. If the ICJ
loosely construes such clauses, states will be reluctant to
include dispute settlement provisions in future agreements.
It must be recalled that international courts are
constituted by treaty and may only exercise the degree of
authority vested in them by appointing charters. This may
stunt the progressive growth of the law, but if
international legal forums go too far they will lose the
support of states ' necessary to their treaty-based
existence
.
In recognition of these concerns, international legal
scholars such as Professor Moore and Professor Reisman have
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argued that a rule of restrictive interpretation should be
applied to compromissory clauses to narrow the range of
disputes deemed to fall under the substantive provisions to
only those matters that the treat parties are explicitly
90
agreeing to submit. In their view, a conservative
approach is necessary to protect this right of states not to
be sued in the absence of clear consent. Professor Reisman
refers to this reliance by a state as a "presumption of
confinement" , and believes it is basic to the use of the
91treaty-based mode. Judge Schwebel adopted this logic in
his dissent in the Nicaragua case where he argued the rule
of restrictive interpretation should apply and applicants
must carry a heavy burden to establish that the
compromissory clause grants the Court requisite
92jurisdiction
.
Sir Hersh Lauterpacht, and other scholars such as
Professor Sohn and Professor Rosenne, contend that a general
rule of treaty interpretation, or a specific rule applicable
to compromissory clauses, has not been established by the
93jurisprudence of the Court. A comprehensive review by
Professor Charney of twelve ICJ decisions which present
questions of compromissory clause jurisdiction supports the
94
view that a much lower threshhold is applied. He
recommends, in complete contrast to Reisman, that any
argument which is not "prima facie implausible" should be
enough to clear jurisdictional hurdles in order to project a
broad and generous policy toward international
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A' A' *• 95adjudication
.
While these prominent scholars differ in their
assessments of the reception which compromissory clauses
have or should receive in international legal practice, the
substantive defects noted with Iran's position under the
Montreal Convention make it a loser regardless whether a
restrictive or "prima facie implausible" standard is applied
to the compromissory clause. Accordingly, the Montreal
Convention is not a satisfactory basis for ICJ jurisdiction
in the Aerial Case.
C. THE 1955 TREATY OF AMITY BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED
STATES
Iran's initial Application to the Court relied solely
on the compromissory clauses of the two conventions
analyzed. When Iran presented its Memorial one year later,
the compromissory clause from the Treaty of Amity Between
Iran and the United States of 1955 was added as a third
basis for jurisdiction. This procedural manuever raises at
the outset whether the rules and practice of the ICJ permit
a state party to subsequently amend filings with an entirely
new jurisdictional premise.
1. DELINQUENT AMENDMENTS TO ICJ PLEADINGS
Baseball enthusiasts will recall that one of Yogi
Berra ' s most memorable quips was that "it seems like deja vu
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all over again." This statement is particularly germane to
this analysis because Iran's reliance on the Treaty of Amity
for jurisdictional and substantive support perfectly mirrors
the contentions of Nicaragua in its case against the United
States in 1984. Apparently Iran "went to school" on the
Nicaragua opinion and has reappeared before the Court
cloaked in the compromissory clause of the bilateral Treaty
of Amity which is nearly textually identical to the
Friendship Treaty invoked by Nicaragua. The ICJ held in the
Nicaragua case:
The Court considers that the 1956 Treaty was not
invoked in the Application as a title of jurisdiction
does not in itself constitute a bar to reliance
being placed upon it in the Memorial ... It is desirable
that the "legal grounds upon which the jurisdiction of
the Court is said to be based" should be indicated at
an early stage in the proceedings, and Article 38 of
the Rules of Court provide for this to be specified "as
far as possible" in the Application. An additional
ground of jurisdiction may however be brought to the
Court's attention later, and the Court may take it into
account provided the Applicant makes it clear that it
intends to proceed upon that basis and provided also
that the result is not to transform the dispute
brought before the Court^into another dispute which is
different in character.
This holding is critical to the Iranian complaint
because while Article 59 of the Statute of the Court states
that ICJ decisions have no binding force except between
parties, the Court has consistently recalled prior rulings
to guide it on similar questions of law. The precedential
value of the Nicaragua opinion is even more certain because
the issue is an identical twin and the ruling is so very
recent. Accordingly, the first point of contention in the
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legal battle to be waged over the compromissory clause in
the Treaty of Amity will be fought not over when the treaty
was first pled, but rather on whether the addition of this
provision "transforms" the dispute into another of much
different character.
2. TRANSFORMING THE PLEADINGS THROUGH THE INCLUSION OF
NEW ISSUES
Iran's subsequent pleading, which brought the Treaty of
Amity into play, add new issues to the case which go beyond
previous arguments made under the substantive provisions of
the Chicago and Montreal Conventions. While those
multilateral treaties are centered on fundamental principles
of air lav/ and the protection of civil aircraft and
passengers from terrorism, the Treaty of Amity concentrates
on establishing bilateral groundrules for consular relations
and "beneficial trade and investment and closer economic
97intercourse." Iran introduces the following substantive
provisions from this agreement as further support of
American violations:
(i) the failure under Article IV to accord "fair and
equittable treatment" to the nationals of the Islamic
Republic who were killed as a result of the United
States' actions;
(ii) the failure under Article VIII to afford unrestricted
trade, in particular concerning the Islamic
Republic ' s ability to purchase a replacement
aircraft; and
(iii) the failure to respect the Islamic Republic's freedom




These additional pleadings appear to expand the range
of issues before the Court to include events in the Persian
Gulf, both before and after, the downing of Iran Air Flight
#655. This would seem to inject questions of neutrality
under the Hague Conventions, concepts of aggression under
the U.N. Charter, and invite American counter-claims
concerning the legality of Iranian attacks on merchant
shipping and the mining of international waters. However,
the Nicaragua case contained similar colatteral matters
which were subsequently injected into the dispute and the
Court did not find them to be a sufficient "transformation"
of issues to prevent full consideration. In light of this
precedent, which is seemingly on all fours with Iran's
claim, the ICJ is unlikely to find that the addition of
commerce and navigation issues transforms this dispute into
a "horse of a different color." Accordingly the Court will
proceed to analyze the applicability of the Treaty of Amity
for jurisdictional purposes.
3. COMPROMISSORY JURISDICTION UNDER ARICLE XXI
Once, the ICJ determines that the Treaty of Amity is
fair game for review, the first step in the process will be
to assess the text of the compromissory provision. This
clause, Article XXI ( 2 ) , states:
Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to
the interpretation or application of the present
Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall
be submitted to the International Court of Justice,
unless the High Contracting Parties agree to
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settlement by some othe pacific means.
The wording of this clause is identical to the compromissory
provision contained in the Friendship Treaty looked at and
adopted by the Court as a sufficient jurisdictional basis in
the Nicaragua case. Additionally, the ICJ reviewed this
very Article during the Hostages case pursuant to the claim
of the United States, and held it was a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction
.
There are four simple prerequisites to the Court's
jurisdiction under Article XXI(2):
(1) that there be a "dispute";
(2) that the dispute relate to the "interpretation or
application" of the Treaty of Amity;
(3) that the dispute be one which is "not
satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy" ; and
(4) that there be no agreement to settlement of the
dispute by some other pacific means.
The text does not provide in express terms that either party
to a dispute may bring the case to the Court by unilateral
application, but the United States argued this was clearly
the understanding of the parties in its briefs during the
99Hostages case.
The first requirement of a "dispute" was readily
established when Iranian nationals were killed in the aerial
incident and subsequent communications between Iran and the
United States concerning responsibility broke down without
resolution. The second element regarding whether the
incident "arises under" the Treaty of Amity is more
contentious. The United States argued during the Nicaragua
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case that this compromissory language was presumed to apply
only to specific commerce or consular related activities.
In support of this, a State Department memorandum dealing
with the compromissory language of a similar Friendship
Treaty was offered which expressed:
The compromissory clause... is limited to questions of
the interpretation or application of this treaty;
i.e., it is a special not a general compromissory
clause. It applies to a treaty on the negotiation of
which there is voluminous documentation indicating the
intent of the parties. This treaty deals with subjects
which are common to a large number treaties, concluded
over a long period of time by nearly all nations.
Much of the general subject matter-and in some cases
identical language-has been adjudicated in the courts
of this and other countries. The authorities for the
interpretation of this treaty are established and
well known. Furthermore, certain important subjects,
notably traffic in military supplies, and the interests
of the country in time of national emergency are
excepted from the purview of the treaty.
While this passages persuasively reflects the United States'
understanding that compromissory clauses like the one in the
Treaty of Amity with Iran were not intended to be a broad
grant of jurisdiction, the ICJ did not find this contention
compelling (by a vote of 13-2) in the Nicaragua case.
Again, the case is on all fours in this respect, and it is
unlikely the ICJ would find the argument more attractive the
second time around.
The United States will no doubt also point repeatedly
to Article XX ( d ) which says the Treaty will not preclude the
application of measures "necessary ... for the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security, or
.,10 2
necessary to protect its essential security interests."
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The facts of the Iran-Iraq War, coupled with American
involvement to protect national security interests and
international peace and stability, would seem to fall
squarely under this provision and block applicability of the
Treaty of Amity to the aerial incident and collateral issues
of navigation and commerce in the Persian Gulf. Once more
this argument was tried and tested in the Nicaragua case,
and the Court found it wanting. The Court held that while
certain matters may have meant to be reserved from the
Court's jurisdiction, the determination of whether a matter
is excluded is not within the unilateral competence of a
state and should be decided by the Court using a reasonable
103
and necessary standard. Iran's contention that VINCENNES
acted unreasonably by manuevering into Iranian territory,
and exceeded any necessity for using force, would appear to
be enough of a showing to meet the legal test articulated in
the Nicaragua case and open the matter to the purview of the
Court.
The third and fourth prerequisites of the compromissory
clause deal with the requirements for friendly diplomacy
between the parties and settlement of disputes through other
pacific means. As discussed supra, the negotiations
requirement is rather elastic and deferential to a state's
unilateral determination that discussions would be futile.
The Court may have reason to pause a moment on this point
because Iran has not been as willing to engage in
discussions as Nicaragua was, and because it was critical of
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Iran in the Hostages case for spurning offers from the
104United States to engage in diplomatic negotiations.
However, this failure is not likely to be fatal to Iran's
claim because it is obvious that the parties are
diplomatically stale-mated over the aerial incident and
neither state will backdown or concede that its actions
violated international law.
4. PREVIOUS DENOUNCEMENTS OF THE TREATY OF AMITY BY
IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES
One final legal dilemma which the Court may ponder
before applying the compromissory provision of the Treaty of
Amity to gain jurisdiction is whether equity should bar Iran
from raising the agreement due to a history of inconsistent
assertions and conduct. This issue was argued in reverse
during the Hostages case where the United States invoked the
Treat of Amity and Iran argued the United States had not
lived up to the agreement. Iran also refused on that
occasion to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ , or comply
with its ruling. Iran also argued then, and later before
the U.S. Iran Claims Tribunal, that the agreement had been
terminated. While the United States admits that the
Treaty of Amity remained in force at the time of the aerial
incident, and is still in force, the Court could find Iran
has breached an essential provision of the agreement or is
estopped from raising it.
Article XXIIK3) indicates that, "Either Party may, by
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giving one year's written notice, terminate the present
Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any
time thereafter." There is no evidence Iran or the United
States presented a written denouncement. Article 54 of the
Vienna Convention states that termination of a treaty, or
withdrawl of a party, may take place in conformity with the
provisions of the treaty or by consent of the parties. Since
no such termination has occurred, the only other way to void
or suspend the agreement in accordance with the Vienna
Convention would be through material breach (Article 60),
impossibility of performance (Article 61) or through a
fundamental change of circumstances (Article 62). The
latter two are unlikely candidates because performance was
possible, and any change of circumstances caused by events
in the Gulf did not "radically transform" the extent of the
obligations
.
An argument can be made that Iran has materially
breached the agreement through its violation of provisions
essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of
the treaty. Article X of the Treaty of Amity calls for
freedom of commerce and navigation between the parties and
this would appear to be elementary to the agreement.
Iranian attacks on reflagged Kuwaiti tankers would be the
clearest examples of violations of this provision, and the
release of free floating mines for the purpose of impeding
navigation would be further evidence of a repudiation
through deeds. However, Article 60(1) of the Vienna
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Convention permits the other state to "invoke the breach as
a grounds for terminating .. .or suspending its operation",
and there is no indication the United States took steps of
revocation following the attacks or in the three years which
have elapsed.
A second line of analysis concerns the possibility Iran
might be estopped for prudential reasons from raising
specific provisions of the Treaty of Amity for international
adjudication and enforcement when it has not fully complied
with the agreement. There is legal precedent to suggest a
state can be restricted by theories of estoppel in
international law, and Judge Lauterpacht has written:
A State cannot be allowed to avail itself of the
advantages of the treaty when it suits it to do so and
repudiate it when its performance becomes too onerous.
It is of little importance whether the rule is based on
what in English law is known as estoppel or the.more
generally conceived requirement of good faith.
The breaches referred to above, as well as Iran's failure to
comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions directing the
cessation of attacks on shipping, suggest a lack of "good
faith." Judge Schwebel termed it "unclean hands" in his
dissent in the Nicaragua case, and he felt it was sufficient
justification to deny Nicaraguan reliance on the Friendship
107Treaty. The only problem with this, from the United
States position, is that Judge Schwebel was in a minority of
two judges who voted against jurisdiction of the basis of
that agreement.
Numerous legal arguments available to the United States
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have merit and could be persuasive to defeat application of
the compromissory clause of the Treaty of Amity. However,
all arguments ultimately lead back to the Nicaragua case
which is so factually similar that it is difficult to
imagine the ICJ will render a different judgment in the
jurisdictional phase of the case.
D. SUMMARY OF THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
In football jargon, Iran has asserted a three prong
"wishbone" attack in order to persuade the ICJ to assume
jurisdiction over the aerial incident of 3 July 1988 caused
when VINCENNES shot down Iran Air Flight #655. The first
option of this offensive attack, ICJ appellate jurisdiction
under the Chicago Convention, is potentially sound but the
proceedings of the ICAO Council leave little doubt the
Council was not convened for the purpose of conducting the
required quasi- judicial hearing into the merits of Iran's
claim. The procedural deficiencies (lack of verbatim record,
party pleadings, oral and written arguments, recorded
vote, etc.) are so at odds with the Council's adjudicative
regulations that Iran cannot demonstrate the requirements of
Article 84 have been satisfied. The only appropriate
conclusion is that the ICAO Council was acting in its policy
capacity pursuant to Articles 54 and 55 when it considered
the aerial incident. Accordingly, the compromissory clause





The second phase of the strategy, the compromissory
clause of the Montreal Convention, appears to fail for
substantive non-compliance. An analysis of the text of the
Convention using the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties' "ordinary meaning", " objects and purposes", and
subsequent state practices tests indicates the agreement was
intended to reach the individual criminal conduct of
saboteurs and terrorists but not official state actions or
the conduct of agents or representatives of the state.
Iran's final "wishbone" option, now that the hand-off
to the fullback has been blocked and the speedy tailback has
tripped in the backfield, is the quarterback keeper under
the compromissory clause of the Treaty of Amity. Although
this jurisdictional grounds was offerred by Iran in a later
pleading, it appears to be the play most likely to score a
touchdown. The factual grounds (exact treaty provisions, a
state of quasi-hostilities between the complaining state and
the United States, and the subsequent use of force by the
United States for the alleged purpose of self-defense) so
closely mirrors the situation encountered by the Court in
the Nicaragua case as to be indistinguishable. The Court
held, by vote of 13-2, that jurisdiction was appropriate in
that instance, and the review likely to be conducted in
connection with Iran's claim in the Aerial Case is expected
to be a legal re-run. A positive finding of jurisdiction is
by no means a tragic consequence for the United States, or a
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crowning victory for Iran however, because the merits of the
Aerial Case are not as readily analagous to Nicaragua as the
jurisdictional claims.
IV. MERITS OF THE AERIAL CASE
A. RULES OF NEUTRALITY UNDER THE LAWS OF NAVAL WARFARE
Iran's Memorial contends the deployment of U.S. forces
to the Persian Gulf was not for the alleged protection of
neutral shipping but part of a larger scheme to assist Iraq
10 8
in its war effort. Iran asserts that such conduct
contravenes neutrality provisions enshrined in the Hague
Convention of 1907 and customary law, and through
interference with Iran's commerce and navigation violated
substantive articles of the Treaty of Amity of 1955. While
issues of neutrality and navigation appear tangential to the
merits of the aerial incident, they need to be dealt with up
front because Iran contends violations of neutrality were
the genesis of the subsequent destruction of the airliner.
If the ICJ is to reach the merits of the VINCENNES case, it
will inevitably have to discuss neutrality concepts at play
in the Gulf War.
The bulk of the law of naval warfare devoted to
neutrality springs from Hague Conventions V and XIII of
1907. These conventions establish a regime in which all
nations have the right to refrain from participation in




carries with it the right of inviolability. Once
invoked, neutral nations are reciprocally obligated to
observe principles of impartiality and abstention. Iran
and Iraq are not signatories to these conventions, but the
provisions are generally declaratory of customary law, and
as such, are obligatory on the two belligerents in the Gulf
War. Iran and Iraq are equally entitled to belligerent
rights since neither was formally designated as the
aggressor by the U.N. Security Council.
As reported in the factual section supra, the method of
warfare waged by Iran and Iraq departed radically from Hague
concepts of neutrality. Both warring states quickly
discarded the traditional right of visit and search in favor
of unannounced and indiscriminate attacks on neutral
merchant ships innocently transiting the Gulf. This
unrestricted policy of tanker warfare has led many
commentators to speculate that neutrality is no longer a
viable concept in international law. Previous practices
from World War II, where some neutral merchants were
targeted on sight, adds further evidence that belligerents
are no longer willing or required to respect neutrality.
Other scholars have contended that international response to
the Gulf War, as evidenced by numerous and unanimous U.N.
resolutions condemning unprovoked attacks on neutral
merchants by Iran and Iraq, obviates any possibility that
112
normative law is being redefined. While the debate over
neutrality may linger among international law professors for
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years, the significance to this analysis is that it shows
traditional concepts of neutrality are in flux and were
further confused during the Iran-Iraq War.
The blurring of strict definitions of belligerents and
neutrals, coupled with the World War II experience
described, is generally agreed to have functionally altered
the legal description of neutral classes to now include
. . . 113
"non-participation of a state in hostilities." This
middle tier category of "nonbelligerency" which has emerged
from state practice has no defined legal status. The U.N.
Security Council impliedly recognized the validity of this
middle ground in carefully selecting the term "states not
parties to the hostilities" when discussing the rights and
. . .
. . 114
responsibilities of neutrals in the Persian Gulf. Under
this refined definition a neutral state which does not
directly participate in armed conflict is not stripped of
neutral status.
These definitional problems are significant because,
while the United States announced observance of a "strict
attitude of neutrality" in the Iran-Iraq War, subsequent
statements by then Secretary of Defense Weinberger suggest a
classification of "nonbelligerent" is more appropriate.
Revelations of the clandestine sale of American weapons to
Iran became an infamous part of the Iran-Contra Scandal, and
recent disclosures of prior sales of "joint-use" equipment
and the passing of satellite intelligence to Iraq during the




Kuwait. Other superpowers were equally involved in Gulf
matters, with the Soviet Union supplying arms to Iraq and
117the Chinese and North Koreans aiding Iran. The great
majority of the Gulf states were supporters of Iraq with the
exception of Kuwait, which attempted absolute neutrality due
to its precarious geographic location between the two
combatant states.
Trying to distill legal principles from this quagmire
of conflicting state practices is difficult, and thankfully,
unnecessary. Focusing strictly on U.S. military actions
indicates it did not overstep the bounds of
"nonbeligerency . " The two different attacks on Iranian oil
platforms in 1987 were legitmate forms of reprisals
conducted in response to illegal Iranian strikes on U.S.
warships. Legitimate resort to self-help remedies does not
remove neutral status. If this were to be so, a neutral
state would have no mechanism for deterring aggression once
attacked illegally other than to join the conflict as a full
fledged belligerent. This would be non-sensical since
international law is designed at its core to first avoid
escalation and participation in warfare, and if unavoidable,
limit the scope of the fighting as narrowly as possible.
All other engagements between naval units and Iranian forces
prior to the VINCENNES incident were confined to localized
fighting in which the United States was responding in
self-defense
.
Iran's pleadings allege repeatedly that U.S. forces
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abandoned a neutral posture but conspicuously omit
discussion of the indiscriminate and systematic attacks
carried out by Iranian gunboats against neutral shipping
during the Gulf War. This is done intentionally because
referral to these incidents would squarely raise Iranian
violations of belligerent responsibilities. The very
convention invoked by Iran, Hague XIII, makes it illegal for
belligerents to attack neutral shipping in the waters of a
119
neutral country. Therefor, all Iranian attacks on
Kuwaiti oil terminals or neutral merchants located in
Kuwaiti or Saudi Arabian waters were clearly outlawed by
international law. These actions also adversely effected
commerce and navigation in contravention of the Treaty of
Amity. The American reflagging and escorting effort was in
direct response to these violations and was a lawful
response to unlawful conduct. Other maritime powers such as
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands
also provided escort services to merchants.
Similarly the clandestine sowing of mines in
international waters violates Hague Convention VIII of 1907
relative
.
to the laying of automatic submarine contact
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mines. The ICJ addressed the use of mines most recently
in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua ( Nicaragua v. United States of America)
(hereinafter Nicaragua Case ) and stated:
...if a state lays mines in any waters whatever in
which the vessels of another state have rights of
access or passage, and fails to give any warning or
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notification whatsoever, in disregard of the security
of peaceful shipping, it commits a breach of the
principles of humanitarian law underlying the specific
provisions of Convention No. VIII of 1907.
Iran's attempt to drag concepts of neutrality into the
controversy over the aerial downing of the airbus is a "red
herring." Whereas the United States activities in the
Persian Gulf might have edged beyond traditional neutral
status toward an emerging category of "nonbelligerency", the
only clear violations of the Hague Conventions of 1907 were
committed by Iran. As discussed, supra, there is legal
precedent to suggest a state can be restricted by theories
of estoppel under international law, and scholars in the
field of international law such as Sir Hersh Lauterpacht do
not believe a state which repudiates a treaty through
123
adverse deeds can later benefit from that agreement.
Iran pledges allegiance to Hague neutrality principles when
charging the United States with violations before the ICJ,
but omits discussion of provisions relating to mining and
respect for neutral territory and property which would have
a boomerang effect if properly reviewed by the Court. The
ICJ should not be fooled by such selective memory.
B. TERRITORIAL INTRUSIONS INTO IRANIAN AIR AND SEA ZONES
A review of the historical examples of commercial
airliner downings reveals that all prior scenarios included
intrusions into the airspace of the over-reacting states.
Iran distinguishes the VINCENNES incident as more eggregious
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on the grounds Iran Air Flight #655 was shot down over
Iranian territory, by a warship which had manuevered into
Iran's territorial sea prior to launching missiles. Iran
invokes the Chicago Convention of 1944, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, and customary law
to support the proposition that territorial intrusions for
military purposes violate state sovereignty and are per se
illegal. Iran also invokes domestic legislation, a 1934 Act
on the Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Zone requiring
advance notification and approval before a warship may enter
Iranian territorial sea, as secondary support for proving a
violation of its sovereignty.
Turning first to international principles of airspace,
the Chicago Convention does create complete and exclusive
state sovereignty over the airspace above land territory
(Art.l), and over territorial waters (Art. 2). This
multilateral convention is a widely recognized source of air
law and the provisions on sovereignty of airspace over land
and sea territory are universally accepted as customary
ii 124international law.
Coastal state control over territorial seas is broad,
but unlike airspace, is subject to the right of innocent
passage. This peacetime navigational regime flows from the
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea of 1958, the
navigational part of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Seas of 1982, and customary international law. In order to
constitute innocent passage the travel must be continous,
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expeditious, and not prejudicial to the peace and good order
125
of the coastal state. The threat or use of force is
1 9 f\
statutorially described as non-innocent. The conventions
also mandate that passage which qualifies as innocent cannot
be hampered, nor may the coastal state impose an advance
notice and permission regime or other requirements on which
have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right
127
of innocent passage.
Applying the law to the facts, VINCENNES was located in
international waters on the morning of 3 July 1988 when the
cruiser received a call for assistance from an unarmed
Pakastani tanker under attack from Iranian gunboats.
VINCENNES steamed to the scene and joined in the defense of
the merchant. While in the process of returning fire the
American warship manuevered within Iran's territorial sea.
These events were contemporaneous with the take-off of Iran
Air Flight #655 from Bandar Abbas, and the airbus remained
within its sovereign airspace when it was downed. Under
ordinary peacetime circumstances, VINCENNES' manuever into
Iranian territorial sea would be characterized
.
as
non-innocent, and therefor illegal, passage. However, the
ongoing surface engagement with Iranian gunboats adds a
fundamental change in circumstances which gives rise to a
justification defense on three separate theories.
First, customary international law has recognized for
over a century the right of hot pursuit as an exception to
] TO
principles of navigation and freedom of the high seas.
- 65 -

While this right is ordinarily invoked by coastal states to
permit pursuit beyond its territory of ships and aircraft
which have violated its domestic laws, the concept centers
around not letting one party gain an advantage from the
application of international law. The same logic forms the
backdrop to laws of warfare, and are generally interpreted
functionally because of the changing techniques employed in
armed conflict or by domestic law violators. As applied to
VINCENNES, international law does not require the warship to
disengage from a legitimate act of self-defense simply
because the Iranian gunboats moved within an imaginary
territorial line. Any other interpretation would extend
boundary protection to a hostile force seeking protection
and place international law in the untenable position of
providing sanctuary to units committing illegal acts of
aggression.
Second, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
contains rules to be applied during peacetime transit. All
"bets" are off between belligerents once the shooting starts
and laws of warfare "kick-in" to govern transit through the
seas. Naval assets are permitted by these laws to move as
necessary on and under the sea, and through airspace, to
conduct attacks on legitimate military targets, provided
military operations respect rules of neutrality for those
nations not involved in the hostilities. The surface
engagement of 3 July 1988 between VINCENNES and the Iranian
gunboats created a combat environment which elevated the
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governing rules from peacetime to laws of warfare. If the
Court reaches this issue it should decide the territorial
encroachment by VINCENNES was lawful under rules of naval
warfare
.
Third, even if peacetime rules are held to apply
throughout the aerial incident, Article 301 of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea calls on contracting states
to refrain from threats or the use of force against
territorial integrity in any matter "inconsistent with
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of
the United Nations." While the U.N. Charter outlaws
aggression in Article 2(4), it also preserves the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense in Article
51. Thus determining whether a territorial intrusion occured
under peacetime navigational rules requires an assessment of
the inherent right of unit self-defense under circumstances
encountered by VINCENNES, and not on a mechanical
application of the navigational regime applied to airspace
or the oceans.
Iran also argues that its domestic laws on territorial
sea passage by foreign warships requires advance
notification and consent which VINCENNES did not apply for
or obtain. When an international agreement conflicts with
domestic legislation, as is the case here, states are split
on whether it "trumps" local law in national courts, but
there is no disagreement that in international courts the
. . . 129
conflicting domestic provision must give way. Not only
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does this canon of interpretation negate the international
effect of Iran's local law, but the ICJ addressed a case
raising the same substantive issue in the Corfu Channel Case
130
( United Kingdom v. Albania) . The Court there considered
an Albanian contention that the passage of British warships
through the Corfu Channel during peacetime, without the
previous authorization of the Albanian government, violated
its sovereignty. The Court held that customary law
recognizes the right of innocent passage through territorial
waters which cannot be prohibited or conditioned on the the
previous authorization of the coastal state. Accordingly,
Iranian domestic law requiring advance coastal state
approval prior to the exercise of innocent passage is
inconsistent with international law and has no effect in the
World Court.
Iran's attempt to bolster its claim against the United
States by adding territorial intrusions as a legal bases for
substantive violations is, like neutrality, tangential to
the circumstances of the incident and are of no consequence
to the merits of the Aerial Case. The primary issue- remains
whether actions of VINCENNES on 3 July 1988 conformed to the
right of self-defense provided in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter
.
C. SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
As discussed in the jurisdiction phase, Iran claims the
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conduct of the Commanding Officer of VINCENNES, and the
United States, amounts to a substantive violation of Article
1 of the Montreal Convention dealing with aerial sabotage.
Iran further contends that by failing to take all measures
to prevent an offense under the treaty and punish the naval
officers responsible with severe penalties, the United
States simultaneously violated Articles 3 and 10 of this
Convention. The United States has made it clear it
considers the actions of VINCENNES to have been lawful, and
131has no intention of prosecuting the Commanding Officer.
The United States also answers that the scope of the
Montreal Convention does not reach the VINCENNES incident,
where the real issue is not aerial terrorism but the use of
force under laws of armed conflict.
The same analysis used to determine the scope and
intent of the treaty-- ordinary meaning test, object and
purposes test, and subsequent state practices--is applicable
when reviewing whether the Montreal Convention influences
the merits of the Aerial Case. It is recalled that all
three of these methods of review lead to the same
conclusion; the Montreal Convention does not reach official
state actions and individual accountability is confined to
criminal offenses. Accordingly, this convention will not be
legally relevant to jurisdiction or merits issues.
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D. THE USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The "mother" of all legal issues in the Aerial Case, to
play on the now popular expression, is whether the use of
force by a state in anticipatory self-defense is legally
sanctioned by the U.N. Charter or customary international
law. And, to continue the analogy, cleanly resolving it in
light of all the legal ambiguity surrounding this concept
may be more difficult than mounting the air and land
campaigns of Operation Desert Storm.
1. U.N. CHARTER BASED ANALYSIS
In conventional law the U.N. Charter is the primary
multilateral agreement which sets the groundrules for the
use of force in the international community. Although Iran
has invoked substantive provisions from numerous other
treaties to support the propositon that the United States
has committed an illegal act of aggression, all of these
pacts take backseat to the Charter if inconsistent. This
"trump-card" provision is set out in Article 103 which
states:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail.
The U.N. Charter endorses the philosophy that states
should settle their differences through peaceful means with
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resort to the use of force permissible only when sanctioned
by the U.N. Security Council. This broad and dramatic
pronouncement is found in Article 2(3) and (4) which state:
(3) All members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice,
are not endangered.
(4) All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.
The intent of these provisions is to task the U.N. Security
Council with maintaining world peace by vesting them with
the exclusive right to "determine the existence of any
threat to peace... or act of aggression and... to restore
132international peace and security." The definition of
aggression was supplied by the General Assembly nearly
thirty years later through adoption of Resolution 3314 in
1974. Article 2 of this resolution provides that the first
use of force in contravention of the Charter is prima facie
evidence of an act of aggression. Examples of what
constitutes aggression are set out in Article 3 and include
the invasion, blockade, bombardment, or attack against
another state's forces or territory.
Member states were not willing to relinquish all
authority to use force to the whims of the politicized
Security Council. Accordingly, the Charter recognizes the
customary right of self-defense in Article 51 which states:
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security.
The perhaps intentionally ambiguous drafting of Article 51
has proven to be a fertile area for legal commentators
trying to define exactly what the terms "inherent right" and
"if an armed attack occurs" mean. Many scholars contend
that Article 51 restricts the right of self-defense to only
those situations in which an armed attack has already
133
occurred. This camp maintains that the threat of
aggression, no matter how real or eminent, is inadequate to
trigger the right to respond with force. This narrow view
would mean that a country, or its deployed military units,
must take the first hit and then seek the endorsement of the
United Nations before responding with self-help remedies
previously authorized under customary international law.
This group of commentators believe the Charter replaces
customary law and is the sole and exclusive authority for
the use of force. Accordingly, these academicians contend
the "anticipatory right of self-defense" is an extinct legal
custom which has been overtaken and precluded by the
OK 4- 134Charter.
Professors McDougal and Mallison presented a different
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analyses based on their review of the travaux preparatoires
of the San Francisco Conference which hammered out and
135
adopted the Charter. In their collective view, Article
51 was drafted to incorporate customary remedies of
self-defense. Judge Lauterpacht commented that the "right
of self-defense is a general principle of law, and as such
it is necessarily recognized to its full extent in
international law." Professor Bowett concurs in this
reading of the Charter based on international practice and
public policy. He points out:
...Such a restriction is both unnecessary and
inconsistent with Article 2(4) which forbids not only
force but the threat of force, and furthermore,
it is a restriction which bears no relation to the
realities of a situation which may arise prior to an
actual attack and call for self-defense immediately if
it is to be of any avail at all. No state can be
expected to await an initial attack which, in the
present state of armaments, may well destroy the
state's capacity for further resistance and so
jeopardize its very existence.
2. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW BASED ANALYSIS
The requirements for anticipatory self-defense,
assuming as I do that the second' group of scholars are
correct and the doctrine is incorporated into the Charter,
have been established through customary law. The most
classic statement of the self-defense doctrine comes from
1 -5 o
1837 American jurisprudence in The Caroline Case . The
Caroline was a small steamer owned by American citizens
which was being used by Canadian insurgents to transport and
resupply rebels opposing British rule in Canada. One night
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a British Commando unit crossed the Canadian border and
destroyed the ship, killing several Americans in the
process. Secretary of State Daniel Webster rejected the
British claim of self-defense but admitted such
justification might be appropriate under different
circumstances
:
The only exception to the inviolable character of the
territory of independent states is self-defense, and
that should be confined to cases in which the necessity
of that defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no
choice of means and no moment for deliberation. An
attack on another state's territory justified by the
necessity of self-defense must be limited by
that necessity and kept clearly within it.
Webster's definition of self-defense gained wide acceptance
in international legal circles in the proceeding century and
was relied on by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal in
convicting senior German officers of war crimes for invading
140Norway.
The legal checklist for anticipatory self-defense which
emerges from this customary process is:
l)The use of peaceful procedures if available;
2)actual necessity for the use of force in responding to
an imminent threat; and
3 )porportionality in the type force employed.
Anticipatory self-defense is an exception to the general
rule against using force and can only be employed when the
threat presents a clear and present danger. A recent use of
the anticipatory self-defense doctrine was the Cuban Missile
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141Crisis of 1962. On that occasion U.S. naval forces
imposed a quarantine to prevent the introduction of Soviet
manufactured strategic missiles to Cuba. The American
response satisfied the legal criteria set out above and was
accepted by the international community as a legitimate use
of the customary right of self-defense.
3. THE EFFECT OF THE NICARAGUA CASE ON THE USE OF FORCE
AND SELF-DEFENSE
Before assessing the VINCENNES incident under
traditional concepts of self-defense, attention must be
directed to the ruling on the merits by the ICJ in the
Nicaragua Case . This decision, which is still being studied
and dissected by international scholars, has been hailed by
some as "one of the most important judgments ever delivered
by the ICJ with seminal findings on the use of force and the
exercise of the inherent right of self-defense under Article
142
51 of the Charter." Others more skeptical label it a
"legal tragedy", and claim "the Court gratuitously cut off
the already beleaguered law of force and self-defense from
whatever clarity and stability go with the written word of
143the Charter."
The complicated facts of the Nicaragua Case deal with
the involvement of the United States in training , arming
,
and assisting a rebel contra force in their attempt to
displace the ruling communist government in Nicaragua in the
early 1980' s. In 1984 the Court found jurisdiction to
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review the claims of Nicaragua under the optional compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court even though the United States had,
prior to the hearing, revoked its declaration of submission.
The United States then boycotted the merits proceedings held
in 1986 and declined to present any evidence to the Court in
support of its position. The nonappearance of the United
States permitted Nicaragua to offer a wide range of
uncontroverted evidence which led the Court to rule that the
activity of the United States in Central America violated
international law. In so finding the Court looked closely
at the U.N. Charter and customary law provisions dealing
with the use of force and collective self-defense. The
Court clearly refuted the argument that the U.N. Charter
superseded customary norms of international law in holding:
As regards the suggestion that the areas covered by the
two sources of law are identical, the Court observes
that the U.N. Charter... by no mean covers the whole
area of the regulation of the use of force in
international relations. On one essential point, this
treaty itself refers to pre-existing customary law... in
the actual text of Article 51 which mention the
"inherent right" of individual or collective
self-defense. The Court therefor finds that Article 51
of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that
there is a natural or inherent right of self-defense,
and it is hard to see how this can be anything other
than of a customary nature.. It cannot therfor be held
that Article 51 "subsumes and supervenes" customary
international law.
The Court also made clear that its decision focused
exclusively on the right of collective self-defense
following an armed attack and does not address the
anticipatory right of unit self-defense under customary law:
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In view of the circumstances in which the dispute has
arisen, reliance is placed by the parties only on the
right of self-defense in the case of an armed attack
which has already occurred, and the issue of the
lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of
armed attack has not been raised. Accordingly the
Court expresses no view on that issue.
The importance of this controversial ruling to this analysis
is the confirmation that customary law regarding the use of
force is alive and was not swallowed by the U.N. Charter,
and, that the holding does not limit the anticipatory right
of individual self-defense in any way.
4. APPLYING THE FACTS OF THE VINCENNES AERIAL INCIDENT
TO THE LAW
The first requisite element for the legitimate use of
anticipatory self-defense is the unavailability of peaceful
alternatives. Iran Air Flight #655 was first detected at
0647:37 at a distance of 47 NM and a speed of 300 kts.
VINCENNES issued its first voice challenge at 0648:25 and
continued attempts to communicate with the aircaraft until
0653:04. During these five critical minutes VINCENNES also
returned fire on Iranian gunboats, instructed an Iranian P-3
operating in the area to stay clear, contacted higher
authority to request permission to engage the inbound
aircraft if necessary, and prepared to defend the ship from
aerial attack. Voice reports from VINCENNES identified the
aircraft as an F-14. The Commanding Officer turned the
missile firing key at 0654 with the aircraft at a distance
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of 10 NM. This sequence of events presents convincing
evidence that VINCENNES had no time to consider or implement
additional peaceful options. The crew made repeated effort
to communicate with the aircraft to warn it off. Even at
flank speed the ship could not have escaped the track of the
incoming target or exited to a position of safety in the few
minutes available. Due to missile flight characteristics
and minimum weapons acquisition ranges it would also have
reduced VINCENNES defensive capabilities if the aircraft had
been allowed to close the ship farther.
The only testimony to suggest peaceful alternatives
remained despite this threatening and rapidly progressing
146
scenario was Cdr . Carlson, Commanding Officer of SIDES.
His expertise and firsthand observation of the unfolding
events make his testimony significant. Cdr. Carlson points
out that even if one presumed the contact was an Iranian
F-14 there was insufficient data to attack it without visual
identification. The lack of fire control emissions from the
contact, no known surface attack capability for this type of
fighter, the improbability an approaching aggressor would be
squawking any IFF code, and the close proximity of the ship
to a commercial air corridor should have delayed the missile
147launch until additional information was collected. These
circumstantial facts may establish that some evidence
available to the Captain of VINCENNES militated against
using force until more data was available, but this
hindsight does nothing to dispel the actual subjective
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belief of the Commanding Officer that his unit was
endangered and entitled to respond in self-defense.
International law, like domestic law, applies an objective
person test for self-defense. On these facts the reasonably
prudent Commanding Officer could have perceived in good
faith that the high speed incoming contact approaching his
unit during the surface engagement was an immediate threat.
The fact that this judgment is open to professional
criticism following investigation and hindsight reflection
does not remove it from the realm of legal justification.
By analogy to domestic law, the homeowner who elects to use
force against an intruder in the home does not lose the
self-defense justification simply because another citizen
may have resisted resorting to self-defense in the same
situation, provided the legal criteria for the defense was
satisfied
.
The second prerequisite for self-defense is actual
necessity at the time force was used. While CDR. Carlson's
comments are again germane, the investigations confirmed
VINCENNES was fired on by Iranian gunboats and was in the
process of returning fire when approached by an air contact
known to have originated from a joint military airfield.
This data, coupled with threatening intelligence information
and a demonstrated Iranian ability to conduct aerial attacks
on U.S. warships, further supported a tactical conclusion
that force was necessary. Aerial threats present an
immediate lethal threat and leave little time for assessment
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and reflection. As pointed out by Professor Parks,
conventional and customary laws of warfare contain a
specific bias against protecting even benign aerial missions
148because of an inherent distrust for aircraft. The
Germans were known to have used aircraft marked for medical
149
evacuation in a dual combat role during WWII , and states
are aware that seemingly innocent aircraft can be used
covertly to gather intelligence, or launch devastating
surprise raids. The bias against aircraft is also found in
the Law of the Sea where ships are permitted innocent
passage through territorial seas, while aircraft are not
150
authorized entry into adjacent airspace. It was not
unreasonable for the Commanding Officer of VINCENNES to have
shared this institutional apprehension against unidentified
aircraft and cautiously concluded that his unit was being
threatened. He no doubt recalled the STARK tragedy and the
reemphasis placed on defending American units in the Persian
Gulf from imminent attack. The factual circumstances, when
considered in toto, compel the determination that the
decision of the Commanding Officer to use deadly force in
self-defense was reasonable and necessary to protect his
ship and crew.
The final criteria for the legitimate use of
self-defense is that the force applied against the target
must be proportional to the threat encountered. There are
few things short of deadly force which can be employed by a
ship at sea to effectively stop a high speed incoming
-

aircraft. In the previous Bulgarian and Soviet aerial
incidents close in gunfire was used to deter further
intrusion by escorting jets, but in those cases there was no
immediate threat and the on-scene military aircraft could
attempt to cripple the airliners without jeopardizing their
own safety. The capability of a guided missile cruiser to
fire warning shots or force down an aircraft differs
drastically from a fighter jet in visual range of a
commercial airliner, and if self-defense is to be a
meaningful right it should not require a warship to permit
an unidentified aircraft close-in ingress before it can
respond with effective force.
The totality of the evidence supports that VINCENNES
acted in unit self-defense and satisfied the elements
established by customary law and incorporated into Article
51 of the U.N. Charter. This conclusion is reinforced by
the decisions of the ICAO Council and the U.N. Security
Council which did not condemn the United States in the
aftermath of the aerial incident presumably because the
international assemblies agreed this was a case of
legitimate self-defense.
E. SUMMARY OF THE MERITS OF THE AERIAL CASE
The VINCENNES aerial incident was a tragic accident
brought on by a series of intervening events which often
accompany conditions within an armed conflict zone. Just as
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"friendly fire" casualties are part of combat, so too are
incidental and collateral damage to non-participants during
hostilities. While laws of warfare are specifically
designed to minimize injuries to civilians, there is no way
to completely eliminate the risk of inadvertent fatalities
when a commercial airliner flies over a "hot" battlefield
and is erroneously judged to be a hostile contact.
The Iranian gunboats created the hazard on the morning
of 3 July 1988 through a consistent pattern of illegal acts
of aggression on neutral merchants transiting the Persian
Gulf. The VINCENNES entered this arena of hostilies in
lawful response to a request for assistance from a merchant
under attack, and this sequence of events set the stage for
the misidentif ication and attack of Iran Air Flight #655
when it wandered into the wrong place at the wrong time.
There is some indication the Commanding Officer of VINCENNES
did not assimilate all available data in textbook fashion,
but there is no evidence to suggest he did not reasonably
believe his unit was about to be attacked by a hostile
military jet.
The public organs responsible for civil aviation and
international peace and security have reviewed the
circumstances and found no violation of conventional or
customary law. Iran now seeks to place the matter in the
lap of the ICJ in hopes of a different outcome. Iran has
presented the Court with a smorgasborg of legal entrees in
hopes of enticing the ICJ to "bite" on the Chicago
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Convention, Montreal Convention, Hague Convention, or the
Treaty of Amity as substantive legal bases for condemning
the United States. However, these agreements do not cover
an aerial incident during time of mutual combat and only
serve to mask the only applicable legal theory involved:
the anticipatory use of self-defense under customary
international law and the U.N. Charter. The ICJ has opined
in the Nicaragua Case that the customary right of
self-defense remains valid legal authority for resorting to
the use of force when no peaceful alternatives exist and the
force to be used is necessary and proportional. The actions
of VINCENNES satisfied this criteria and were reasonable
under the circumstances. If the ICJ finds jurisdictional
authority for the case and proceeds to the merits of Iran's
claim, it should hold in favor of the United States. At
that point the unfortunate VINCENNES incident can be retired
to the annals of international law to serve as another
striking reminder of the unintended, but deadly,
consequences often inflicted on non-combatants in times of
armed conflict.
VI. COMPENSATION FOR AERIAL INCIDENTS CAUSED BY OFFICIAL
STATE ACTION
Shortly after the facts of the shootdown became clear
the United States announced officially, through a speech by
President Reagan on July 11, 1988, that compensation would
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be offered to the families of the victims once necessary
details could be worked out. Vice-President Bush
confirmed this during his speech to the U.N. Security
Council where he stated, "It is a strongly felt sense of
common humanity that has led our government to decide that
the United States will provide voluntary, ex gratia
compensation to the families of those who died in the crash
152
of #655." Due to the absence of diplomatic relations
with Iran, information concerning the ages and earning
capacity of the victims was unavailable. The United States
requested the Swiss government to intervene, in their
capacity as the protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran,
for the purpose of gathering data and distributing
153
compensation. Efforts by Swiss representatives to
perform this role failed because the Iranian government's
sole response to repeated requests for information and
assistance was that all financial damages arising out of the
incident must be disbursed directly to the "Iran Insurance
154Company." The United States then unilaterally developed
a compensation plan that provided for uniform payments per
victim in the amount of $250,000 for wage earning victims
and $100,000 for non-wage earners. This offer was
extended solely as a humanitarian gesture and on the
condition that the United States was not acting out of legal




A. GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL LAW
The basic rules for international claims settlement
derive from customary state practice and fall under the
category of the law of state responsibility for injuries to
aliens. Because this area of international law is a
creature of custom, emergence of a norm is tied to
historical evidence which establishes a widespread state
practice carried on under a sense of legal obligation
referred to as opinio juris. Accordingly, the public
announcements and compensatory actions of states taken in
the aftermath of intentional or accidental attacks on
commercial airliners is vital to determining what
international laws, if any, govern this aspect of the Aerial
Case
.
An analysis of the previous aerial downings produces a
consistent practice of paying compensation, with one notable
exception. The governments of Bulgaria, China, Israel,
Japan and Iraq all paid corresponding claims to victim state
governments on behalf of the deceased passengers. Among
these examples it is interesting to note Bulgaria offerred
to pay Western claims in the midst of the Cold War, the
Japanese paid a claim to the U.S. just before the start of
WW II, and Iraq paid compensation to the U.S. only months
before Operation Desert Storm. In each case the official
announcement of the intent to provide compensation was made
near in time to the incident to diffuse the outrage of the
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international community. Countries which have not had a
direct stake in accepting compensation due to the death of a
citizen-passenger, have nonetheless participated in the ICAO
Council and U.N. Security Council deliberations following
each tragic event. The concerted call for compensation as a
necessary ingredient of internationally accepted remedies
has been a common thread in the patchwork of each aerial
incident. The countries which paid this compensation are
nations with great geographic, political, and ethnic
diversity, and as demonstrated, payment was even made when
the nations involved were ideologically opposed. This
consistent practice of paying compensation, coupled with the
concurrance and acceptance of the international community,
is strong evidence that a widespread and uniform custom
exists in favor of remunerations to the victimized states
out of a sense of legal responsibility.
The lone exception to this customary practice is the
Soviet government, which refused all claims in 1952 after
the attack on the French airliner, and did likewise in 1983
after the Korean airliner was downed. The Soviet Union is a
major participant or specially affected state in
international aviation, and their inconsistent behavior can
either be viewed as proof that a norm in favor of paying
compensation lacks the necessary opinio juris to become
customary law, or is an abberation which violates customary
law.
The latter view is the more attractive for two reasons.
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First, one state standing alone against the tide of an
otherwise universal practice should not be able to
unilaterally prevent the emergence of customary law. A good
example of this is Libya and their claim that the Gulf of
Sidra is part of their internal or territorial waters. This
claim is inconsistent with customary and conventional law
regarding the drawing of baselines and boundary
delimitation, and as a result, the international community
has labelled the Libyan claim excessive and illegal.
Second, it is not crystal clear that the Soviet Union has
elected to stake out a position which is entirely at odds
with customary international law. The downing of the Air
France plane in 1952 occurred before any custom had been
created, and the reaction of the Soviet government after
the attack on KAL #007 was to excuse the aggression as a
defensive measures necessary to prevent a sovereign
intrusion. This "shoot first" policy was consistent with
repeated Soviet pronouncements concerning their absolute
sensitivity toward border intrusions. While many states
protested this practice, it was only through the Montreal
Protocal of 1984 that the international community made
certain that the use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight was intolerable. If the KAL incident were to occur
today, there is a significant liklihood that the growth of
international law in this area would force the Soviet
government to respond differently or suffer harsh
international condemnation and meaningful sanctions.
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While it is always difficult to predict when a
particular practice in the international community has
become customary law, the practice of paying compensation is
an extensive and virtually uniform custom which appears to
have matured into normative law.
B. LIABILITY FOR PERSONNEL INJURIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
INCIDENTAL TO MILITARY OPERATIONS
The shootdown of Iran Air Flight #655 was the first
commercial downing to occur amid direct military operations.
Accordingly, separate rules which govern the payment of
compensation for colatteral damage caused to non-combatants
and property during armed conflict must be consulted. While
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Conventions of
1907 lay down comprehensive conventional guidelines for the
conduct of military operations, the principles concerning
payment of liability again spring from custom. The Legal
Advisor to the State Department, Abraham Sofaer, testified
to Congress in August 1988 that the rules are as follows:
1) Indemnification is not required for injuries or
damages incidental to the lawful use of armed force;
2) Indemnification is required where the exercise of
armed force is unlawful; and
3) States may, nevertheless, pay compensation ex gratia




From a legal perspective, the critical determination in
these rules is whether the use of force was lawful. If so,
no compensation is necessary; if not, compensation is
required as a matter of law. Absent intervention by an
international political or judicial organ, the state
committing the questionable act is apparently permitted to
self-judge or auto-interpret the lawfulness of that act. In
the case of VINCENNES, the U.S. determined, per my analysis
correctly, that the warship properly acted in self-defense
and is therefor not legally obligated under current
international law to compensate the victims.
C. EX GRATIA COMPENSATION
Despite the perceived lack of a legal duty, the U.S.
offerred humanitarian compensation to the victims of Iran
Air Flight #655 in the form of ex gratia payments. There is
international precedent for ex gratia payments as derived
from diplomatic practice and previous aerial incidents, and
this type of indemnification appears to be a very handy
device for nations who regret the loss of life but are
politically unwilling to pay compensation if it implies an
international wrong was committed. From one perspective it
is a utilitarian and compassionate method for paying
unfortunate victims of official state action. Professor
Maier has argued:
It is in the interest of the United States and the
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world community, and certainly in the interests of
innocent victims of incidents of this kind, to maintain
the mechanism of the ex gratia payments. The ability
to make such payments without creating a legal
precedent permits and encourages de facto aid to
victims in circumstances where the actual facts cannot
be found and interpreted or where, for other reasons
acknowledging legal liability might be
q
politically
unacceptable to the nation involved.
Professor Lowenfeld takes a contrary view of ex gratia
payments in the Aerial Case because he believes it creates a
system which hinges on discretionary humanitarian payments
following the downing of commercial airliners and does not
properly promote the safety of civil aviation. He argues
for a rule of strict liability and mandatory compensation
regardless of fault, so long as the cause (official state
action) can be established. He reminds that America has
asserted a principle of legal responsibility in every prior
aerial downing and that proposed Article 3 bis from the
Montreal Protocal, which in his opinion is not a fault based
rule, is now declaratory of international law.
As is often the case with difficult questions of law
and policy, both positions have merit. No doubt there are
times when the utility of humanitarian payments, which
permit avoiding a public acknowledgement of responsibility,
ensures a nation does the right thing to remedy an
unfortunate situation or international wrong. However, in
the context of aerial mishaps with the corresponding loss of
hundreds of innocent lives the proposition that a state can
self-judge whether, and to what degree, compensation is
appropriate would appear inadequate to protect passengers in
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international civil aviation. While the United States made
an exhaustive attempt to gather information necessary to
compute compensation after the VINCENNES incident and then
elected to make a generous offer, absent mandatory legal
mechanisms the possibility looms large that other nations
may not be so righteous.
Even within legal circles in the United States, and
among friendly allies, there is disagreement over which
incidents require mandatory compensation and which are
suitably covered by ex gratia payments. For example, the
attacks on the STARK or LIBERTY were apparently accidental
actions occurring near to combat zones under similar
circumstances to that of VINCENNES. In both cases the
official position of the United States remains that ex
gratia payments are inappropriate and that the compensation
tendered was done so as a matter of legal requirement. Yet
it is difficult to contrast the VINCENNES incident, where
America has adamantly maintained that ex gratia payments are
warranted, with that of STARK or LIBERTY. At first glance
it might appear that the United States seeks the most
favorable position when it is the victim but wants the most
lenient regime when it is the unintended aggressor.
While I do not attribute such self-interest to the
United States, in my opinion this is precisely the problem.
In past cases the nations victimized have demanded
compensation as a matter of right while the offending states
have insisted on presentating payment in the form of ex
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gratia compensation. In the future it can be expected that
nations which are victimized will repeat this demand and
those responsible for the downings will continue to seek the
utility of ex gratia payments. In order to address this
problem international law must adopt a compensation
mechanism which is not centered on fault. The preambular
language of the Montreal Protocal of 1984 speaks of
promoting safe and orderly civil aviation, coupled with a
concern for elementary considerations of humanity for the
lives of persons on board civil aircraft. Creating a fair
system to ensure international passengers will not have to
rely on the self-judging discretion of a state to determine
compensation after an aircraft is attacked and downed, would
appear to fall within this charge.
The ICAO Council is the international body with the
most expertise in the field of civil aviation. It was in
this assembly that the impetus for drafting and adopting the
Montreal Protocal derived. It would seem that this body
should also develop a mandatory mechanism for awarding
compensation when a state uses weapons, either intentionally
or accidentally, against commercial aircraft. Placing the
assessment of compensation in the hands of an international
body should ensure consistency and fairness in the
application, and get away from the political posturing and
imbalances which have plagued this area of international law




Although the downing of Iran Air Flight #655 occurred
almost three years ago, the legal issues involved are just
now reaching the ICJ for legal resolution. In my assessment
the Court will find jurisdictional authority in the
compromissory clause contained in the Treaty of Amity
between the United States and Iran. The merits of the case
will hinge on the customary right of unit self-defense and
the actions of VINCENNES will be found consistent with
international law. Finally, this case points out the need
for ICAO to create a consistent method for determining
compensation so that the rights of innocent victims of
aerial incidents will be fully protected.
The only diplomatic mechanism left to derail this
pending judicial determination would be a last minute
agreement to enter into bilateral negotiations with the
subsequent acceptance by Iran of American offers to pay ex
gratia compensation. This remains the best possible outcome
for both nations, and sometimes it is the threat of actual
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